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I. Introduction 
On July 9, 2019, the European Court of Human Rights 
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(“ECtHR”) ruled in favor of Valeriya Igorevna Volodina, a 
domestic violence victim, in a suit against Russia, awarding her 
20,000 euros as well as legal expenses.1  The ECtHR is a court 
created by the European Convention on Human Rights to enforce 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2  The ECtHR looks to 
member-state nations to determine whether these nations have 
breached the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Convention.3  The 
ECtHR found in the present case, Volodina v. Russia, that Russia’s 
failure to adopt legislative and social policies to safeguard its 
citizens against domestic violence resulted in a discriminatory effect 
on the nation’s women.4 
In Russia, a woman dies every forty minutes as a result of 
domestic violence.5  In addition, there are 36,000 women who are 
beaten daily by their partners6  and experience brutal attacks, 
including being “choked, punched, beaten with wooden sticks and 
metal rods, burned intentionally, threatened with various weapons, 
sexually assaulted and raped, pushed from balconies and windows, 
[and] having their teeth knocked out[.]”7 
Despite this staggering number, Russia lacks legislation 
protecting victims of domestic violence.8  As a signatory of the 
 
 1 Volodina v. Russia, App. No. 41261/17, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2019), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/rus#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
194321%22]} [https://perma.cc/7ZNM-458E].  This opinion has not yet been published in 
the official reporter. 
 2 EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 3 (Feb. 2014), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4XS-
3SE9]. 
 3 Id.; EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 4 (Feb. 2014), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/questions_ 
answers_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWJ3-EJ93]. 
 4 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 132–33. 
 5 Rebecca Adams, Violence Against Women and International Law: The 
Fundamental Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 57, 
62 (2007). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Yulia Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me” Weak State 
Response to Domestic Violence in Russia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/25/i-could-kill-you-and-no-one-would-stop-
me/weak-state-response-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/YC9N-TFNU]. 
 8 There is no statute that specifically addresses domestic violence.  UGOLOVNYI 
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] arts. 111–116 (Russ.) 
[hereinafter RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE].  For a full discussion on the state of the law 
regarding domestic violence and the Russian Criminal Code, see infra Part III. See 
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United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women,9  Russia is obliged to stop violence 
against women by both private individuals and the government,10  
but instead, Russia has failed to create systematic safeguards to 
protect victims.11  In fact, Russia has rolled back previous 
established avenues of protection by decriminalizing non-
aggravated battery offenses in 2016 and re-defining aggravated 
battery to exclude domestic violence in 2017.12  Under this regime, 
victims have found neither support nor remedy from the 
government.13  However, with the culmination of Volodina, other 
pending cases in the ECtHR,14  and increased attention to the issue,15  
Russia may be pressured to proactively combat violence against 
women.16 
 
generally Nerses Isajanyan, Russian Federation: Decriminalization of Domestic Violence, 
L. LIBR. CONG., (June 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/domestic-violence/russia-
decriminalization-domestic-violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TQC-8MW8]. 
 9 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (ratified by the Russian Federation Jan. 
23, 1981).  
 10 CEDAW, General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, 11th Sess., ¶¶ 
9, 24 U.N. Doc. A/47/8 [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19] (finding 
states must act with “due diligence” to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence against women). 
 11 See Gorbunova, supra note 7. 
 12 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 4. For a full description of these legislative changes, 
see infra Part III.A. 
 13 See Andrew Higgins, Russia’s Police Tolerate Domestic Violence. Where Can Its 
Victims Turn?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/ 
europe/russia-domestic-violence-european-court-of-human-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/97QB-X9Z9]. 
 14 Tunikova v. Russia and 3 Other Applications, App. No. 55974/16, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(June 28, 2019), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-194607%22]} 
[https://perma.cc/K3U3-TMPJ].  The four other pending cases are Tunikova v. Russia, 
Gershman v. Russia, Petrakova v. Russia, and Gracheva v. Russia.  Id.  For a discussion 
on the facts and current status of the four cases, see infra Part V.B.ii. 
 15 See Gorbunova, supra note 7. 
 16 Currently, there is a draft bill to help victims of domestic violence.  Проект 
Закона о Профилактике Семейно-Бытового Насилия [Draft Law on the Prevention of 
Domestic Violence], СОВЕ́Т ФЕДЕРА́ЦИИ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ 
ФЕДЕРАЦИИ [FED’N COUNCIL OF THE FED. ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSS. FED’N] (Nov. 29, 2019), 
http://council.gov.ru/services/discussions/themes/110611/?fbclid=IwAR2eaGXQUrPGm
dRdETlyC_9dEy0ADcXNViHTlyK8KLMavtPLXGA79b6LIY [https://perma.cc/L8TR-
QKZ6] [hereinafter Draft Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence].  For a full 
discussion on the bill, see infra Part IV.A. 
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Part II provides background information on the ECtHR as well 
as a history of Volodina v. Russia.  Part III analyzes the state of the 
law regarding domestic violence in Russia and the lack of 
protections for victims.  Part IV discusses the prevalence of 
domestic violence in the nation and its normalization as a part of life 
for the Russian family.  Part V examines the implications of 
Volodina, including pending legislation and other solutions.  Part 
VI concludes the piece. 
II. Legal Background 
A. A History of the European Court of Human Rights 
Born from the ashes of World War II, the United Nations was 
formed in October of 194517  to “save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war,” “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights,” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom[.]”18  Among the United Nations’ first actions was 
the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”).19  Adopted on December 10, 1948, and guaranteeing 
freedoms such as the “right to life, liberty and security of 
person[,]”20  the UDHR is touted “as a common standard of 
achievement[] for all peoples and all nations[.]”21 
Two years later, the Council of Europe, a regional human rights 
organization, adopted the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“Convention”) which gave effect to the protections named in the 
UDHR.22  Every member-state of the Council of Europe has ratified 
 
 17 History of the United Nations, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/ 
history-united-nations/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GCN-QJ65] (last visited June 7, 
2020). 
 18 U.N. Charter Preamble. 
 19 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 20 Id. art. 3. 
 21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/8AEQ-XBFF] (last visited June 7, 2020); see 
also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R (“OHCHR”), https://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/udhrindex.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/F67Q-HWGS] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (“Translated into hundreds of 
languages and dialects from Abkhaz to Zulu, the UDHR set a world record in 1999 for 
being the most translated document in the world.  [The Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights’] goal is to share the UDHR with the entire world[.]”). 
 22 See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 2, 
3, 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
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this treaty, illustrating a promise to uphold its values.23  Section II 
of the Convention created an international judiciary organ, the 
European Court of Human Rights, to enforce the UDHR.24  This 
court looks to member-state nations to determine whether fellow 
nations have breached their citizens’ rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.25  To have standing in the ECtHR, a petitioner must 
have exhausted all domestic remedies26  and allege a specific 
violation of the articles of the Convention.27  Judgments from the 
ECtHR are final,28  and since its founding in 1959, the ECtHR “has 
delivered more than 10,000 judgments regarding alleged violations 
of the [Convention].”29 
The ECtHR was created to enforce two important provisions of 
the Convention.  First, Article 3 guarantees that “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”30  Second, Article 14 provides that “[t]he enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status.”31  It is through these articles that Ms. Volodina 
 
Rights].  The Convention is also known as the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  Id.  “[T]he Council of Europe is the oldest and largest 
European organization, unifying 47 member states to promote human rights.”  About the 
Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/yerevan/the-coe/about-
coe/overview [https://perma.cc/AM67-LKP9] (last visited June 7, 2020).  To prevent 
confusion, it is important to distinguish between the Council of Europe, the European 
Council, and the European Union.  Do Not Get Confused, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused [https://perma.cc/3SYM-
XPTC] (last visited June 7, 2020) (providing a brief overview of the three organizations). 
 23 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL. OF EUR., 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/ 
signatures?p_auth=csTxtz7n [https://perma.cc/P3AU-435F] (last updated Jan. 20, 2020). 
 24 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, arts. 19–51. 
 25 See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., supra note 3. 
 26 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 35. 
 27 See id. art. 34. 
 28 Id. art. 44. 
 29 European Court of Human Rights, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR., 
https://ijrcenter.org/european-court-of-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/DD2Q-34J7] (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 30 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 3. 
 31 Id. art. 14. 
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brought her case to the ECtHR. 
B. Statement of the Case 
Ms. Volodina began to date her assailant, S, in November 2014 
in the city of Ulyanovsk.32  After a separation in May 2015, S began 
to threaten and abuse, physically and mentally, Volodina for the 
next three years.33  Volodina repeatedly sought protection from 
authorities and a haven in the judicial system—each time she was 
denied.34 
In January 2016, Volodina reported to authorities that S had 
damaged her car’s windscreen.35  Russian authorities refused to 
prosecute S, reasoning that as he had replaced the windshield, no 
crime had occurred, and S’s “actions had not constituted any 
offence.”36  That same month, Volodina escaped to Moscow.37  
After publishing her curriculum vitae online, Volodina was 
contacted by an alleged human resources manager, D, for an 
interview, where D arranged transportation.38  When D arrived, S 
emerged from the back of the car, and took Volodina’s phone and 
other items.  S forcefully returned Volodina to Ulyanovsk.39  During 
several days of imprisonment, S beat Volodina, resulting in her 
hospitalization.40  After Volodina reported the attack, authorities 
refused to initiate proceedings as they had not received a written 
complaint from her.41  In March of 2016, Volodina withdrew her 
complaint and police declined to prosecute S, holding no crime had 
been committed.42 
That May, S punched and strangled Volodina who again went 
to the police, only to be met with yet another refusal to prosecute, 
 
 32 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 8. 
 33 Id. ¶ 9. 
 34 Id. ¶¶ 9–16. 
 35 Id. ¶ 10. 
 36 Id. ¶ 11. 
 37 Id. ¶ 12. 
 38 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 12–13. 
 39 Id. ¶ 13. 
 40 Injuries to Volodina included bruising to the soft tissue on her head and increased 
risk of a miscarriage because she was nine weeks pregnant.  Volodina underwent a 
medically-induced abortion at this time.  Id. ¶ 14.   
 41 Id. ¶ 15. 
 42 Id. ¶ 16. 
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reasoning that a single punch did not constitute battery, which 
requires a victim to sustain two or more punches.43  Volodina again 
fled to Moscow.44 
In July and August, S physically attacked Volodina, threatened 
to kill her, and damaged the hydraulic braking system of her car.45  
Volodina pled to authorities for relief but was again denied because 
a single blow did not constitute battery and the threats were 
insufficient to prove her life was in danger.46  Authorities also 
refused to pursue criminal charges by classifying this violence as a 
lover’s quarrel, noting that Volodina and S “knew each other, had 
lived together before and had maintained a common household.”47 
In early 2018, S shared Volodina’s private photographs on 
social media.48  In March of the same year, S placed threatening 
phone calls to Volodina and lurked around her home.49  The police 
declined to open an investigation, arguing there was no danger that 
S would carry out his threats.50  Later that month, when Volodina 
was taking a taxi, S intercepted the taxi, jerked Volodina from the 
car and began to drag her towards his car.51  After Volodina sprayed 
tear gas into S’s face, he grabbed her purse and fled.52  Volodina 
went to the police station to report this attack and S shortly arrived 
and returned her items.53  Police declined to open an investigation 
stating that because the items had been returned, no crime had taken 
place.54 
Volodina then asked for state protection.55  The authorities 
refused, noting that “‘no real threats to her person or property from 
[S] . . . have been established.  The threats that [Volodina] 
previously complained about are the product of 
 
 43 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 19. 
 44 Id. ¶ 20. 
 45 Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
 46 Id. ¶ 23. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. ¶ 30. 
 49 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 31. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. ¶ 32. 
 52 Id. ¶ 32 (2019). 
 53 Id. ¶¶ 32–33. 
 54 Id. ¶¶ 34–36. 
 55 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 37. 
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personal hostility between them and of [S]’s jealousy.’”56  Volodina 
has since legally changed her name to prevent S from finding her.57 
Volodina brought an action to the ECtHR against Russia in June 
201758  alleging that “Russian authorities had failed in their duty to 
prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of domestic violence which 
she had suffered at the hands of her former partner and that [Russia] 
had also failed to put in place a legal framework to combat gender-
based discrimination against women.”59  Volodina provided 
evidence of the prevalence of domestic violence in Russia and its 
adverse effects on women.60  Evidence included a report from the 
Ministry of the Interior finding in 2015 that 54,285 reports of crimes 
in the home were reported of which 32,602 were against women; in 
2016, the number of crimes in the home increased to 65,535 with 
42,164 being against women; and in 2017, while the number 
dropped to 38,311 reports of crimes in the home, 24,058 were 
committed against women.61  Other evidence introduced included 
(1) a study from the Russian Federal Statistics Survey and the 
Ministry of Health finding that 20% of women experienced physical 
violence and 38% had been subjected to verbal abuse;62  (2) a report 
by the Anna Centre for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, a 
Russian nongovernmental organization, which found “violence in 
one form or another in every fourth family,” and that “two-thirds of 
homicides were attributable to family/household-related motives, 
that about 14,000 women died each year at the hands of their 
husbands or relatives, and that up to 40% of all serious violent 
crimes were committed within families[;]”63  and (3) a report by 
Russia’s High Commissioner for Human Rights who “noted a lack 
of progress in addressing the problem of domestic violence[.]”64 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. ¶ 39. 
 58 Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 
 59 Id. ¶ 3. 
 60 Id. ¶¶ 40–45. 
 61 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 41. 
 62 Id. ¶ 42. 
 63 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17,  ¶ 44. 
 64 Id. ¶ 45; see also Уполномоченный приняла участие в конференции 
“Женщины против насилия” [The Commissioner Took Part in the Conference “Women 
Against Violence”], УПОЛНОМОЧЕННОГО ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА В РОССИЙСКОЙ 
ФЕДЕРАЦИИ [COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. IN THE RUSS. FED’N] (Dec. 7, 2017), 
http://ombudsmanrf.org/news/novosti_upolnomochennogo/view/upolnomochennyj_prinj
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The ECtHR held that Russia had violated Article 3 of the 
Convention by allowing Ms. Volodina to be subject to repeated 
torture, degradation, and inhuman treatment.65  The court held 
Russia responsible for the violations because it failed to meet three 
obligations required of member-states in order to protect individuals 
within their borders against ill treatment.66  The breached 
obligations to protect individuals include (1) establishing “an 
adequate legal framework affording protection against ill-treatment 
by private individuals;” (2) taking “reasonable measures . . . to 
[protect against] a very real and immediate risk of ill-treatment of 
which authorities knew[;]” and (3) conducting “an effective 
investigation when an arguable claim of ill-treatment has been 
raised[.]”67 
For the first obligation, the ECtHR found that because Russia’s 
Criminal Code fails to “define domestic violence . . . as a separate 
offence or an aggravating element of other offences . . .  [the Code] 
falls short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive 
obligation to establish and apply effectively a system punishing all 
forms of domestic violence and providing sufficient safeguards for 
victims.”68  For the second obligation, the Court held Russia failed 
to prevent occurrences of violence because authorities took no 
measures of protections such as “restraining orders, protection 
orders or safety orders” to stop further contact between the victim 
and abuser.69  Russia failed in its third obligation because it did not 
open a full criminal case against S, instead opting to complete “pre-
investigation inquiries” which were not “serious attempt[s]” to 
protect Volodina.70 




 65 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 102. 
 66 The ECHR states that member-states have “positive obligations under Article 1 of 
the Convention” that must be “read in conjunction with Article 3, to ensure that individuals 
within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment[.]”  Id. ¶ 76. 
 67 Id.  ¶ 77. 
 68 The Court further lamented that Russia failed its positive obligation to set a 
framework where there is a “minimum threshold of gravity of injuries required for 
launching public prosecution[.]”  Id. ¶ 85. For a discussion on Russia private versus public 
prosecution systems, see infra Part III.B. 
 69 See Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 88–90. 
 70 See id. ¶¶ 94–101. 
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legislation or other protective measures had resulted in extensive 
domestic violence nationwide, resulting in a “discriminatory effect 
on women[,]” violative of Article 14 as the violence 
disproportionately affects women, and that this lack of redress 
means women do not have equal protection of the law.71  Thus, the 
ECtHR found Russia failed in its obligations to protect its female 
citizens against domestic violence. 
III. State of the Law Regarding Domestic Violence in Russia 
A. Limitations of the Russian Criminal Code 
Russia guarantees equality for all in its constitution,72  but this 
façade of protection quickly disintegrates in light of Russia’s lack 
of legislation addressing domestic violence.  Instead of relying on 
guaranteed constitutional protections, victims are forced to ground 
their domestic violence claims among other provisions in the 
Russian Criminal Code.73  This Code, however, offers little, if any, 
remedy for victims as it fails to account for domestic violence 
 
 71 Id. ¶¶ 132–33 (“[T]he continued failure to adopt legislation to combat domestic 
violence and the absence of any form of restraining or protection orders clearly 
demonstrate . . . the problem of domestic violence in Russia and its discriminatory effect 
on women.”).  For a discussion on gender discrimination cases and the ECHR, see 
generally, LISA MCINTOSH SUNDSTROM ET AL., COURTING GENDER JUSTICE: RUSSIA, 
TURKEY, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford University Press 2019). 
 72 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSKII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 19 
(Russ.) (“Man and woman shall enjoy equal rights and freedoms and have equal 
possibilities to exercise them.”). 
 73 See RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, arts. 111–116.  Most neighboring 
nations have policies to combat domestic violence.  Russia is not a member of the EU, but 
Russia’s close proximity to EU nations allows for comparisons between Russia and peer 
nations.  For instance, twenty-four of the twenty-seven member-states of the EU have 
National Action Plans to combat “gender based violence.”  Rosamund Shreeves & Martina 
Prpic, Violence Against Women in the EU: State of Play, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. 
7 (Nov. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/644190/ 
EPRS_BRI(2019)644190_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/59SC-F4H5].  Most member-states 
have legislation to combat domestic violence, with thirteen member-states “imposing a 
higher penalty under general criminal law provisions for violence within the 
family/household or perpetrated by a current or ex-partner as an aggravated offence” and 
nine member-states introducing the “specific, named offence of [domestic violence] or 
violence against a close person into criminal law.”  Jolanta Reingarde et al., Review of the 
Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States: Violence 
Against Women—Victim Support, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL. 23 (2012), 
https://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Violence-against-Women-Victim-
Support-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH6A-G44P]. 
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crimes and limits the victim’s ability to bring forth a claim. 
For over two decades, there have been multiple efforts to enact 
legislation to protect victims to no avail.74  The first attempt was in 
1993 by the Women of Russia political party whose effort was 
discontinued after 40 revisions.75  From 2012 to 2016, there was 
another attempt to pass legislation that would allow for restraining 
orders, but the bill was never adopted.76  In 2016, a section on 
“domestic battery” was added to the Criminal Code, but was soon 
removed due to conservative backlash.77  The latest attempt was in 
fall of 2019, when activists submitted a draft to the Russian 
parliament, but after the upper house of parliament published its 
own version greatly differing from the original, the bill has since 
stalled.78 
Russia’s Criminal Code does not distinguish between violence 
in the home and violence between strangers.79  Under the Code, 
there are three types of assault: grievous bodily harm; medium 
bodily harm; and minor bodily harm.80  Article 111 defines grievous 
bodily harm as the intentional infliction of a grave injury hazardous 
to human life or harm involving the loss of sight, speech, hearing, 
or any organ or the loss of the organ’s functions, and is punishable 
by at least eight years in prison.81  Article 112 defines assault by 
medium bodily harm as involving the intentional infliction of injury 
not hazardous to human life and having caused protracted injury to 
health or considerable stable loss of general capacity for work by 
not less than one-third, and is punishable by a term of six months to 
 
 74 See Alexey Yurtaev, Inside the Fight over Russia’s Domestic Violence Law, 
OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-
domestic-violence-law/ [https://perma.cc/9NSL-7PQL]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.; see also ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., RUSSIAN FEDERATION STAKEHOLDER 
REPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW. 2 (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/the_advocates_russia_dv_upr_fina
l_to_upload.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VXW-CGPB]. 
 77 See Maria Karnaukh & Robert Coalson, New Push to Pass Domestic Violence Law 
Angers Russia’s ‘Traditional Values’ Conservatives, RADIOFREEEUR. RADIOLIBERTY 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-domestic-violence-law-traditional-values-
conservatives/30283060.html [https://perma.cc/HN7Y-TFUF]. 
 78 Yurtaev, supra note 74.  At the time of this publication, there has not been 
legislation passed in Russia regarding domestic violence. 
 79 See Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 50. 
 80 See RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, arts. 111–116. 
 81 Id. art. 111. 
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five years.82  Article 115 defines assault by minor bodily harm as 
the intentional infliction of light injury which has temporarily 
damaged health or caused insignificant stable loss of general 
capacity for work, and is punishable by fine up to 40,000 rubles or 
the perpetrator’s salary for three months, or arrest for up to four 
months or compulsory labor.83  Domestic violence is often 
categorized as assault by minor bodily harm,84  meaning those 
convicted face only fines or imprisonment for several months—
thus, perpetrators face little punishment for their actions. 
Another offense often seen in domestic violence cases, 
aggravated battery,85  is defined in Article 116 as actions committed 
for disorderly or discriminatory motives which have caused 
physical pain but do not involve the consequences in Article 115.86  
Prior to 2017, aggravated battery contained a reference to “close 
persons,” including partners, but in a 2017 amendment, Parliament 
dropped this reference.87  Now, only those who commit battery for 
 
 82 Id. art. 112. 
 83 Id. art. 115. 
 84 Martin R. Huecker & William Smock, Domestic Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECH. INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK499891/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Q52-B792] (last updated Oct. 15, 2019) (“While most events are minor, 
for example grabbing, shoving, pushing, slapping, and hitting, serious and sometimes fatal 
injuries do occur.”); see also Types of Domestic Violence, ARIZ. COAL. TO END SEXUAL & 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.acesdv.org/domestic-violence-graphics/types-of-
abuse/ [https://perma.cc/D89A-ER98] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (finding that most types 
of physical abuse include restraining, hitting, shaking, pulling, etc. which would not meet 
the high bar of gravity or average gravity).  But a sizable number of cases in Russia could 
qualify for as elevated assault and be subject to public prosecution.  For example, after 
Margarita Gracheva divorced her husband for abuse, he drove her to a forest and chopped 
off both her hands with an axe.  Tunikova, App. No. 55974/16, ¶¶ 45–49.  Domestic 
violence escalates over time; thus, it is important that victims have recourse early on with 
effective prosecution to stop further abuse and violence.  Amy Thomson, Can It Really Go 
That Far: Escalation in Domestic Violence, BREAK THE SILENCE AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE (Dec. 22, 2017), https://breakthesilencedv.org/escalation-domestic-violence/ 
[https://perma.cc/GY6P-VZRD] (“It may take a while for the abuser to worsen the level 
violence used against their victim, but it is likely to occur and could include significant 
physical assault, rape, or strangulation.”). 
 85 See Caitlin Mahserjian, Comment, We’re All in This Together: A Global 
Comparison on Domestic Violence and the Means Necessary to Combat It, 79 ALB. L. 
REV. 297, 306 (2016). 
 86 Further, Article 116 covers violent acts committed out of motives based on 
political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or based on hatred for 
a social group.  RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.   
 87 The amendment to Article 116 removed from the list of criminal offenses ones the 
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racial, religious, political, social, or disorderly motives may be 
charged with aggravated battery.88  Non-aggravated battery, the 
infliction of violent acts that cause physical pain but not for 
“ruffian” or discriminatory motives, was de-criminalized in 2016 
and classified as an administrative offense punishable by a fine or 
detention.89  Further, first-time, non-aggravated battery offenses 
among family members are decriminalized, “signaling to abusers 
that [domestic violence] is a less serious offense[,]”90  and, so, 
perpetrators get a free pass for initial, or infrequent, offenses.91  
With the de-criminalization of non-aggravated battery, perpetrators 
merely get a slap on the wrist for offenses.  Because of the Code’s 
failure to account for domestic violence, women are left with 
insufficient protections in the current statutory scheme. 
B. Shortcomings of Russia’s Private Prosecution System 
Victims are further hindered by Russia’s private and public 
prosecution system in which some offenses must be litigated by 
private parties.92  Only offenses of assault by grievous and medium 
bodily harm are liable for public prosecution, meaning, for these 
offenses, the police take over the entire process; offenses of assault 
by minor bodily harm and offenses of battery are subject to private 
or public-private prosecution.93  Victims of domestic violence are 
 
“battery of close persons that resulted in physical pain but did not inflict harm or other 
consequences[.]” Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 88 RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116. 
 89 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 2–3.  KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII RF OB 
ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP RF] [Code of Administrative 
Violations], art. 6.1.1 (Russ.) [hereinafter RUSSIAN CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES]; 
RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.1. 
 90 Jacqulyn Kantack, European Court Slams Russia over Domestic Violence Case, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/22/european-
court-slams-russia-over-domestic-violence-case [https://perma.cc/JLB8-YS93]; see 
RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.1. 
 91 See Kantack, supra note 90. 
 92 See UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UPK RF] 
[Criminal Procedure Code] art. 20(1) (Russ.) [hereinafter RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CODE]. 
 93 Id. art. 20(2) (“[C]riminal cases on crimes envisaged by Articles 115, Part One and 
116, Part One of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, are seen as criminal cases 
of private prosecution, are initiated only upon application from the victim or from his legal 
representative[.]”); id. art. 20(3) (providing that criminal cases of public-private 
prosecution include criminal cases of crimes under Article 116.); id. art. 20(5) (providing 
that criminal cases, with the exception of the criminal cases referred to in parts two and 
328 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
disproportionately affected because interfamilial violence is often 
classified as assault by minor bodily harm or battery, and, therefore, 
only eligible for private prosecution.94  When offenses are subject 
to private prosecution, the onus is on victims to “collect evidence, 
identify the perpetrator, secure witness testimony and bring charges 
before a court.”95  Private prosecution requires that the victim 
initiate the proceedings with Russian courts, and if a victim wants 
legal representation, she must obtain counsel through her own 
resources.96  This places a large burden on victims mentally and 
financially and is unlike public prosecutions in which it is the 
authorities who collect evidence and bear the cost.97  Alarmingly, in 
private prosecution, “the failure of the victim to appear without 
serious reasons shall entail the termination of the criminal case[.]”98  
And cases of private prosecution are subject to “reconciliation” in 
which suits are terminated if the parties reconcile; meaning, no 
prosecutor will step in—as soon as the victim stops pushing for 
justice, any avenue of redress has ended.99  Such procedural hurdles 
imposes a hardship on victims, already suffering mentally and 
physically, to actively pursue a potential lengthy case and see it to 
the end. 
A private prosecutorial system is antithetical to the cyclical 
nature of domestic violence,100  and it is not surprising that 90% of 
private prosecution cases are terminated.101  Often, victims will take 
action, such as filing a complaint, immediately after the abuse has 
 
three of this article, are considered criminal cases of public prosecution). 
 94 See Huecker & Smock, supra note 84. 
 95 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 46. 
 96 See RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 92, art. 246(3) (“On criminal 
cases of the private prosecution the charge in the judicial proceedings shall be supported 
by the victim.”). 
 97 See Kantack, supra note 90 (“[Authorities] force victims to seek justice through 
private prosecution, a process that is both expensive and demanding upon the victim.”). 
 98 RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 92, art. 249(3). 
 99 Id. art. 20(2).  Courts are required to explain reconciliation to the parties.  Id. art 
319(5). 
 100 See Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, ANNA – CTR. 
FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 5–7 (Oct. 2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/ 
CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT_CEDAW_NGO_RUS_21870_E.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7Z52-A6JZ]. 
 101 Id. at 6. (“[T]he vast majority of cases of private complaint (90%) are terminated 
for two reasons: (1) The failure to fulfil the court’s requirements to resolve the 
shortcomings of the complaint; (2) The reconciliation of the parties.”). 
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occurred.102  However, as time passes, the victim will “remove the 
complaint” for various reasons, leaving the perpetrator facing no 
consequences.103  Victims of domestic violence are often hesitant to 
face their abusers in court, will recant statements, or even return to 
their abusers.104  Some recant out of fear for their or their children’s 
safety.105  Victims may also be financially dependent on their 
abusers and feel returning to them is the only option.106  Victims 
often return to partners who have repented for their former 
behavior—this “honeymoon phase” is an expected component of 
the domestic violence cycle.107  Because victims struggle to bring 
their abuser to justice for emotional, physical, and financial reasons, 
private prosecution is the wrong way to ensure victims are protected 
and abusers are prosecuted. 
In its current state, the Sisyphean task placed on victims to seek 
justice in Russia signals a structure intentionally designed for the 
victim to fail.108  Significant burden is placed on the victim to seek 
justice in the private prosecutorial scheme, and even when a victim 
does follow procedures, Russian law is very forgiving for both non-
lethal violence and first-time offenses,109  granting perpetrators 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Why Do Victims Stay?, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay [https://perma.cc/2NG5-LQ4B] (last visited Jan. 
26, 2020); see also Rachel Louis Snyder, We Prosecute Murder Without the Victim’s Help. 
Why Not Domestic Violence?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/opinion/sunday/domestic-violence-recanting-
crawford.html [https://perma.cc/YF5D-E6M2] (“Domestic violence victims recant their 
testimony as much as 70 percent of the time . . . . [Victims] do so to protect themselves 
against their abusers’ retaliation when they feel that authorities cannot or will not help.”). 
 106 Why Do Victims Stay?, supra note 105. 
 107 Jennifer Focht, The Cycle of Domestic Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH RES., 
http://www.center4research.org/cycle-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/46ZX-PA2L] 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (explaining the cycle involves (1) the tension building phase; 
(2) the abusive incident; and (3) the honeymoon phase, during which “the abuser may 
apologize, buy gifts, or be extra affectionate to ‘make up’ for the abuse.  Many will promise 
to change, promise to stop abusing, or promise that it will never happen again.  These 
assurances are intended to persuade the survivor to stay in the relationship.”). 
 108 Snyder, supra note 105. 
 109 See Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, supra note 100, 
at 5-7 (explaining that there is a heavy burden on women in domestic violence cases); see 
also Kantack, supra note 90; RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 9, art. 116.1 (showing 
that first time and non-lethal offenses are lightly punished). 
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freedom to act with impunity.110  Because of the limitations of the 
Russian Criminal Code and the shortcomings of private 
prosecution, the Russian criminal system lacks sufficient 
protections for victims of domestic violence. 
IV. A Culture of Acceptance 
A. A Lack of Knowledge Regarding Domestic Violence 
Statistics in Russia 
The extent of domestic violence in Russia remains unknown as 
the government “does not maintain centralized, disaggregated 
statistics[,]” but even modest estimates illustrate its ubiquity—
sustaining a culture of acceptance of domestic violence.111  
Exacerbating this insufficiency is the fact that partner violence is 
not an independent legal offense which would enable better tracking 
of incidents.112  Despite these barriers to information, non-
governmental studies estimate that 36,000 women suffer physical 
violence daily with 14,000 women killed by family members each 
year.113 
Actual instances of domestic violence are likely higher than 
current estimates given that domestic violence is a universally 
under-reported crime.114  Countries with available data report that, 
“only 40 per cent of [] women who experience violence seek help 
of any sort[.]”115  Among women who do come forward, most look 
to family and friends for support, with very few turning to formal 
institutions, such as police and health services, for redress.116  Most 
victims remain silent due to “fear of reprisals, economic and 
 
 110 See Higgins, supra note 13.  Ms. Volodina’s attorney commented upon the 
decriminalization of battery, noting that “[i]n Russia, [perpetrators] get one free beating a 
year.”  Id. 
 111 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 1–2; see also Amnesty Int’l, Russian Federation: 
Briefing to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 12, AI 
Index EUR 46/022/2010 (July 2010) (“[T]he true scale of domestic violence against 
women in Russia remains unknown.”); SUNDSTROM ET AL., supra note 71, at 145–46. 
 112 See supra Part II.B, III. 
 113 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 2. 
 114 See Facts and Figures: Ending Violence Against Women, UN WOMEN, 
https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-
figures [https://perma.cc/T4ZM-XG7Z] (last updated Nov. 2020). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
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psychological dependence, anticipation that the police will not take 
the charges seriously and viewing the assault as a private matter.”117  
A 2014-15 survey found that over one-half of respondents in Russia 
had either experienced domestic violence or knew someone who 
had.118  However, this estimate is likely skewed low, considering 
that 60 to 70 percent of women who experience domestic violence 
in Russia make no report.119  Even with conservative estimates, 
domestic violence is an egregious and pervasive problem in Russia. 
B. Partner Violence as the Norm in Russian Culture 
1. Institutional Bias 
Compared to other victims of domestic violence across the 
globe, Russian women are even less likely to seek help because of 
institutional bias and a culture unsympathetic to victims.120  As 
evidenced by Volodina’s case, authorities rarely provide avenues of 
redress.121  One attorney described the “typical police attitude as 
[one] requiring homicidal-level violence to secure their attention, 
suggesting that police intonate ‘[i]f there is a dead body, we will 
come,’ or ‘[c]all us if you’re murdered.’”122  Even when authorities 
act, punishments are mild, including “modest fines from 5,000 to 
30,000 rubles, 60 to 120 hours of compulsory work or, rarely, 10—
15 days of confinement.”123  Such dismissive attitudes and lack of 
 
 117 U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE: GENDER-RELATED 
KILLING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 42 (Nov. 2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/GSH2018/GSH18_Gender-related_killing_of_women_and_girls.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5HU8-YELQ].  According to Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive 
Director of U.N. Women, “[w]e still do not know the true extent of violence against 
women, as the fear of reprisals, impact of not being believed, and the stigma borne by the 
survivor — not the perpetrator — have silenced the voices of millions of survivors of 
violence and masked the true extent of women’s continued horrific experiences[.]”  
Deanna Paul, U.N. Finds the Deadliest Place for Women Is Their Home, WASH. POST, 
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/26/un-finds-deadliest-
place-women-is-their-home/ [https://perma.cc/LE94-E9F6]. 
 118 Higgins, supra note 13. 
 119 One reason women may not report violence is the lack of redress.  Only 3 percent 
of such cases go to trial.  Gorbunova, supra note 7.   
 120 See generally Isajanyan, supra note 8 (describing the active discouragement of 
reporting and lack of legal structure to protect victims of domestic violence). 
 121 See supra Part II.B. 
 122 ADVOCS. OF HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 5. 
 123 Id.  In U.S. dollars, this range is approximately $72.00 to $438.00 as of June 11, 
2020.  Currency Converter, BUS. INSIDER, https://markets.businessinsider.com/currency-
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enforcement discourage victims from reporting crimes.124  For 
instance, 72 percent of women who called the national help line 
never sought aid from police, and of those who did call, 80 percent 
were unsatisfied with police response.125  The institutional bias 
against victims present in Russia law enforcement benefits 
perpetrators and promotes domestic violence as a norm. 
This bias is present even in the upper echelon of the Russian 
government.  President Vladimir Putin, who is not likely to 
relinquish power anytime soon, promotes a conservative culture 
sympathetic to perpetrators.126  In 2017, President Putin proudly 
signed into law the decriminalization of domestic abuse by making 
aggravated battery among “close persons” an administrative 
offense.127  Putin has been president since 2012 and the de facto 
leader of Russia since 2000.128  In this time, Putin has taken over 
much of the Russia government, directly and indirectly.129  
Parliament rubber-stamps all of his proposals130  and the Kremlin 
controls Russian television.131  In early 2020, the entire government 
resigned, with the Prime Minister being replaced by Mikhail V. 
Mishustin, an obscure tax chief who is seen as a “technocratic 
 
converter/russian-ruble_united-states-dollar [https://perma.cc/3YRW-WQFT] (last visited 
June 11, 2020). 
 124 See Gorbunova, supra note 7. 
 125 Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, supra note 100, at 
3. 
 126 Feliz Solomon, Vladimir Putin Just Signed Off on the Partial 
Decriminalization of Domestic Abuse in Russia, TIME (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://time.com/4663532/russia-putin-decriminalize-domestic-abuse/ 
[https://perma.cc/F6NK-DZC8]. 
 127 Id. See supra Part III.A. 
 128 Masha Gessen, The Willful Ambiguity of Putin’s Latest Power Grab, NEW YORKER 
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-willful-ambiguity-
of-putins-latest-power-grab [https://perma.cc/8M5M-UDQ6]. 
 129 Id. (“Putin wields such power over all aspects of Russian government that 
consolidation is hardly possible; Russian courts take dictation from the President and bend 
the law any way he wants—plus, the parliament is always ready to rubber-stamp any law 
into existence at a moment’s notice[.]”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 See generally Daria Litvinova, Human Wrongs: How State-Backed Media Helped 
the Kremlin Weaponise Social Conservatism, REUTERS INST. (July 2018), 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-
10/Daria%20Litvinova%20Journalist%20Fellow%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRN7-
AM8C] (providing an overview of how the Kremlin gained control over Russian media). 
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placeholder” to allow Putin to continue holding power.132  Putin has 
also introduced constitutional reforms, approved by Parliament,133  
and ratified by voters, allowing him to remain in power until 
2036.134  Thus, Putin will likely be leader for life.135  With a 
president who does not support domestic violence reform, has full 
authority to pass legislation at will, and is likely to be in power 
indefinitely, it will be hard to effectuate change that advances 
protection for domestic violence victims. 
This widespread bias against victims has led to few institutional 
protections.136  No national programs combatting domestic violence 
exist and there is a shortage of crisis centers.137  In fact, it is 
international non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) that 
provide the most programs and on-the-ground protection.138  But 
even NGOs are hampered in their efforts due to the Foreign Agents 
Law, passed in 2012, which requires NGOs to register as foreign 
agents if they receive foreign funding.139  This designation “is 
tantamount to being labeled spy or traitor[,]”140  so many NGOs 
 
 132 Polina Ivanova & Katya Golubkova, ‘Technocratic Placeholder’? Putin Picks 
Low–Profile Tax Chief as Russian PM, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-mishustin/technocratic-placeholder-putin-
picks-low-profile-tax-chief-as-russian-pm-idUSKBN1ZE2OO [https://perma.cc/F9A9-
WNEJ]; see also Anton Troianovski, Big Changes? Or Maybe Not. Putin’s Plans Keep 
Russia Guessing, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/ 
world/europe/putin-russia-changes.html [https://perma.cc/B645-WQSW]. 
 133 Anton Troianovski, Putin Endorses Brazen Remedy to Extend His Rule, Possibly 
for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/ 
europe/putin-president-russia.html [https://perma.cc/Z4AE-R7KS]. 
 134 Andrew Higgins, The Theatrical Method in Putin’s Vote Madness, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/putin-referendum-
vote-russia.html [https://perma.cc/TY6A-TS9S]. 
 135 Id.  See Andrew Higgins, Russia’s Highest Court Opens Way for Putin to Rule 
Until 2036, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/ 
world/europe/russia-putin-president-for-life.html [https://perma.cc/ET9X-SEDU]. 
 136 See supra Part III. 
 137 ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 6. 
 138 Id. (“Moscow has approximately 150 shelter spaces to serve a city of 12 million 
people . . . Nationally, at best, existing shelters provide only a few hundred beds in a 
country of 140 million . . . Approximately 20 NGOs throughout the country also operate a 
small number of crisis centers and shelters.”). 
 139 Id.; see also Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups: The Battle Chronicle, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (June 18, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-
groups-battle-chronicle [https://perma.cc/2ZUU-HE25]. 
 140 ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 6. 
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have closed their doors after this designation from lack of support.141 
A lack of governmental support means avenues of change and 
awareness, such as protesting and the arts, are limited.  All public 
protests require government authorization and “anyone caught in an 
unsanctioned protest more than once in a six-month period risks 
being fined anywhere between 600,000 to one million rubles . . . or 
up to [f]ive [sic] years of forced labor or prison.”142  Furthermore, 
there is an attack on the arts in Russia deemed avant garde.  A ballet 
that featured nudity and a homosexual relationship was cancelled 
two days before its premiere.143  While the official statement cited 
production issues, rumors exist that the company received a call 
from a Kremlin official or Orthodox cleric, prompting the 
cancellation.144  With a government refusing to protect some of the 
most vulnerable members of society, it is possible this attitude has 
seeped down to the citizenry who also accept domestic violence as 
the norm. 
2. Rise of Conservatism 
Beyond institutional bias, a cultural issue exists concerning 
opinions of domestic violence.145  A resurgence of conservative 
values in Russia has cemented men as the patriarchal head of the 
household.146  And the rise of President Putin has pushed masculine 
 
 141 Id.; Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups: The Battle Chronicle, supra note 139 
(“To date, Russia’s Justice Ministry has designated 158 groups as ‘foreign agents,’ courts 
have levied staggering fines on many groups for failing to comply with the law, and about 
30 groups have shut down rather than wear the ‘foreign agent’ label.”). 
 142 The currency conversion is approximately $17,124 to $28,540. Madeline 
Roache, Russia’s Version of #MeToo Has Struggled to Take Off — Until Now, TIME, 
https://time.com/5636107/metoo-russia-womens-rights/ [https://perma.cc/S5D2-PZRX] 
(last updated Aug. 2, 2019).  A fine for protesting is astronomically larger than that of a 
fine for the administrative offence of battery.  For the entire statutory scheme regarding 
protesting, see RUSSIAN CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 89, art. 20. 
 143 Joshua Yaffa, ‘They Will Destroy You’: In Putin’s Russia, How Far Can an Artist 
Go?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/17/putin-
kirill-serebrennikov-arts-clampdown-russia-bolshoi [https://perma.cc/3XK7-XKLZ]. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Higgins, supra note 13; see also Andrew Stickely et al., Attitudes Toward Intimate 
Partner Violence Against Women in Moscow, Russia, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 447, 447 
(2008) (finding in a study that less than half of Russians surveyed thought partner violence 
against women was a serious problem). 
 146 See ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 2.  Upon Putin’s re-election in 2012, 
he has pushed more conservative policies on social issues such as domestic violence, 
including a law banning gay “propaganda.”  Gabriela Baczynska, Victims of Domestic 
2021 A DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT ON WOMEN: VOLODINA V. RUSSIA 335 
ideals to the forefront of Russian culture.147  This movement does 
not view domestic violence as problematic and is typically against 
progressive ideas like LGBTQ and women’s rights.148  The Russian 
Orthodox Church, a pillar of the conservative movement,149  is 
against feminism; in fact, the head of the Church, Patriarch Kirill, 
called feminism a “dangerous phenomenon[.]”150  Russia’s 
conservative institutions also support familial violence to keep their 
values dominant; for instance, the Parents’ Meeting, “promote[s] 
physical punishment in a family as a cultural tradition.”151  
Conservative proponents in Russian government and society 
perpetuate the belief that it is not only acceptable, but expected, that 
a husband will beat his wife to ensure his authority.152 
Conservatives have been able to effectively organize and push 
their agendas to maintain their support of domestic violence.  
Currently, more than 180 “traditional values” organizations exist in 
Russia.153  These groups sometimes use acts of terror to promote 
their agenda; in 2017, groups mounted attacks against the film, 
Matilda, which described the affair of Crown Prince Nicholas, later 
Tsar Nicholas II, and a Polish ballerina.154  Assailants, angered by 
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the negative portrayal of the Tsar who was “canonized as an 
Orthodox saint in 2000[,]” assaulted the studio with Molotov 
cocktails, and attempted to ram a car into a cinema screening the 
film.155  Conservatives push against reforms they consider “attacks” 
on Russian lifestyle—Andrei Kormukhin, the leader of Forty 
Forties, a Russian Orthodox organization, criticized the 2019 draft 
legislation on domestic violence, asking “[w]hy should our 
conservative-traditional country—which, according to our leader, 
has its own, unique civilization—adopt foreign values?”156  
Conservatives find social change like pro-LGBT ballets and 
protective legislation a “forcible alteration of the basic foundations 
of Russian society and the destruction of [] traditional family and 
moral values[,]”157  and fight to maintain the status quo developed 
under President Putin. 
Even Russian citizens unaffiliated with the conservative 
movement or the Orthodox church hold traditional values and are 
likely to hold perpetrators blameless for acts of violence.158  In 2017, 
as the media spotlight was focused upon ex-film producer Harvey 
Weinstein and his repeated sexual assaults of female actresses, the 
Russian public opinion was split with some blaming the victims.159  
Even among female actresses, opinions were polarized.160  Actress 
Lyubov Tolkalina responded to the Weinstein allegations, stating, 
“If you land a role, does it matter how you got it? How can you 
blame a man for sexual harassment, isn’t it his meaning of life?”161  
Fellow actress Agnia Kuznetsova reiterated the sentiment, stating, 
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“These gals got what they wanted[.]”162 
In contrast to conservative Russians who see domestic violence 
advocacy as “ideas imported from the West” that erode “traditional 
norms,” progressive citizens advocating for reform are typically 
younger.163  However, Russia’s population is imbalanced with lower 
child birth rates and a growing elderly population.164  By 2050, 
Russia “is projected to have more seniors than young children”; 
therefore, with imbalanced demographics, it is difficult for the 
youth solely to effectuate change.165 
These attitudes mean that when victims do come forward, they 
face victim blaming by both the police and the public.166  Darya 
Ageniy, a nineteen year old who was raped, is currently facing 
criminal charges for injuring her rapist after she fought back.167  
Authorities also told Ageniy that she should have “called the police 
while she was being attacked, instead of trying to defend herself.”168  
Similarly, members of the Orthodox Church blame women for 
violence perpetrated against them.169  The late Archpriest Vsevolod 
Chaplin argued that rape victims are to blame due to their 
“indecent[,]” “provocative” appearances.170  Even fellow citizens 
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are quick to blame the victim.171  After one woman shared her story 
of abuse from her spouse on social media, one user asked, “Why 
didn’t you just marry a normal guy, instead of an asshole?”172  The 
conservative culture which has gripped Russia is not one that is keen 
on protecting victims of domestic violence; in fact, the goal is to 
keep families together, regardless of the cost to its members. 
V. Future Implications 
A. Current Actions in the Russian Legislature 
In fall of 2019, shortly after the Volodina ruling, activists, 
legislators, and lawyers developed and submitted a draft law to the 
Russian parliament addressing domestic violence.173  Later that 
year, Russian Parliament released a draft of their own bill.174  The 
Parliament bill acknowledges the existence of domestic violence as 
a crime and defines it as a “a deliberate act causing or containing 
the threat of causing physical and (or) mental suffering and (or) 
property damage[.]”175  Only spouses, former spouses, persons with 
a common child, close relatives, and those living together or owning 
the same property are able to be convicted of domestic violence.176  
The bill also allows protective orders to be issued to stop all contact 
between the perpetrator and victim;177  however, this judicial 
restraining order can only be issued if it is shown the perpetrator has 
another place to live.178  Unfortunately, there are no provisions 
allowing for the criminal prosecution of perpetrators.179 
The bill has faced backlash on both sides.180  Over 180 
conservative organizations have signed an “open letter denouncing 
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the proposed bill” labeling it as an attack on traditional Russian 
values.181  CitizenGo, a conservative advocacy group, began an 
online petition with over 35,000 signatures against the bill, framing 
it as “based on the radical anti-family ideology of feminism[.]”182  
Alternatively, supporters of enacting reform legislation argue the 
bill fails to (1) criminalize domestic violence, (2) cover all forms of 
violence, and (3) protect all at risk of domestic violence with its 
narrow definition of who is protected.183  The bill is currently in 
flux, but with strong public backlash and a history of over 40 
domestic violence bills previously quashed in the last two decades, 
it is a grim outlook for the bill becoming law.184 
B. External Forces of Change 
It is possible that external pressures outside of Russia could 
persuade the government to enact reform.  Several avenues of action 
and their potential for success are discussed below. 
1. Treaties 
Intergovernmental organizations have not been successful in 
persuading Russia to make reforms.185  The Council of Europe, in 
an attempt to combat interfamilial violence, held the Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic 
Violence (“Istanbul Convention”) in 2011 which entered into force 
in 2014.186  Russia, as a member of the Council, declined to sign or 
ratify the Istanbul Convention—only one other country, Azerbaijan, 
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has declined to sign.187 
But even treaties to which Russia is a party fail to advance 
change due to a lack of enforcement measures.188  Ratifying a treaty 
promising to give individuals enumerated human rights does not 
guarantee that a state will follow through with its obligations.189  For 
example, Russia is a party to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which is a bill of 
rights for women enacted by the United Nations.190  The Committee 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”) monitors the implementation of the Convention by 
collecting reports from member-states on their progress in fulfilling 
the Convention.191  CEDAW can also issue general 
recommendations on how member-states can come into compliance 
with the Convention.192  Like the ECtHR, individuals can bring 
complaints against member-states alleging the state has violated the 
Convention193  and the CEDAW committee can issue a quasi-
judicial ruling.194  Per General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW 
considers gender violence a form of discrimination and places on its 
members a positive obligation to “act with due diligence to prevent 
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and 
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for providing compensation.”195 
In 2019, the CEDAW Committee ruled in three cases that 
Russia failed the due diligence standard to protect victims of 
domestic violence.196  These cases were brought by women who had 
experienced partner violence197  with little to no assistance from 
Russian authorities,198  and each alleged a violation of General 
Recommendation No. 19.199  The CEDAW Committee found Russia 
had failed to implement the Convention,200  required Russia to 
financially compensate the women,201  recommended Russia 
criminalize gender-based violence, provide adequate investigation 
of domestic violence, give free legal counsel to victims, develop 
adequate training for authorities, etc.202  But Russia has little reason 
to comply with these rulings as the Committee has no power to 
sanction member-states who violate the Convention.203  In fact, 
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Russia has yet to take steps to come into compliance with their 
positive obligations under the Convention and with no 
consequences for non-compliance, it does not appear the ratification 
of a treaty will push Russia to make changes to its current domestic 
violence framework.204 
2. Further ECtHR Cases 
While many peer nations have developed reforms to protect 
victims, Russia has yet to partake,205  but as international attention 
to the problem mounts, Russia may be pressured to take action.206  
Four additional cases like Volodina’s are pending before the 
ECtHR.207  In 2016, Natalya Tunikova filed a suit after a Justice of 
the Peace dismissed her private prosecution appeal against her 
abuser for being 16 minutes late to the hearing.208  Ms. Tunikova 
was then convicted of grievous bodily harm for stabbing her abuser 
in an attempt to defend herself from being thrown off the balcony.209  
Elena Gershman filed suit in 2017 after her spouse was acquitted of 
assault and police refused to institute criminal proceedings.210  Irina 
Petrakova petitioned the ECtHR when authorities refused to file 
charges against her partner because of the 2017 reclassification of 
battery among family members as an administrative offense.211  
Lastly, in 2019, Margarita Gracheva filed suit because after 
repeated attempts to get help from authorities went unanswered, her 
former partner chopped her hands off, and after this, she was unable 
to bring negligence claims against the inspector who refused to help 
her.212 
Currently, these are considered “communicated cases.”213  A 
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communicated case means that the ECtHR has received the 
application from a party making a claim against a state and wants to 
give an opportunity for the state “to react.”214  The Court sends to 
the state the “application, the relevant documents, a statement of 
facts made by the registry, and a series of questions and issues [] to 
address.”215  After the state reacts, the applicant can then respond.216  
While Volodina v. Russia has been adjudicated,217  these cases are 
currently awaiting a response from Russia.218  On June 28, 2019, the 
ECtHR certified three questions to the parties in each case—the 
women and Russia—asking their opinion on whether (1) Russian 
authorities “discharge[d] their obligation to protect the [women] 
against ill treatment” in violation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights; (2) the Russian government violated Article 14 of 
the Convention by refusing to recognize the extent of the problem 
of domestic violence and failing to take measures to protect victims; 
and (3) there is an “underlying systemic problem or a structural 
deficiency” in Russia to combat the issue.219 
The Volodina case included similar claims that authorities failed 
to act;220  thus, it can be inferred that Russia may face analogous 
adverse rulings from the same court.  But even if all the cases 
pending before the ECtHR resulted in monetary damages, this alone 
would be insufficient to invoke change in Russia.  The ECtHR 
awarded Ms. Volodina 20,000 euros in her case against Russia, 
equivalent to $22,500.221  If similar judgments were awarded in the 
other cases, Russia would be paying just over $100,000, arguably 
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3. The Pilot-Judgment Procedure 
Alternatively, the ECtHR could invoke the Pilot-Judgment 
Procedure against Russia to force the nation to act.223  When the 
Court must make rulings on similar cases, the ECtHR can invoke 
the Pilot-Judgment Procedure to reach “determinations about a 
systematic problem and instruct[] the government to adopt policy 
and legal changes to prevent similar violations in the future.”224  
Thus, the ECtHR could force Russia to change its policies or face 
consequences for ignoring the judiciary.225  The most likely solution 
would be to compel Russia to adopt specific legislation and a 
framework for addressing domestic violence.226  These new statutes 
addressing domestic violence should criminalize domestic violence 
and require public prosecution—placing the burden on the state to 
initiate, investigate, and prosecute perpetrators; further, victims 
should be able to be granted immediate restraining orders to be 
protected from their assailants.227  Additionally, the ECtHR could 
demand domestic violence training for law enforcement, social 
workers, and others who interact with victims.228 
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However, as the Pilot-Judgment Procedure has had mixed 
success, it cannot be relied upon to make systemic changes in 
Russia.229  The first use of the procedure was in Poland’s “Bug 
River” cases230  which dealt with reparation of property rights after 
residents were forced to abandon their properties after Poland’s 
eastern border was re-drawn post-World War II.231  It is considered 
successful because the procedure resulted in Poland creating new 
legislation, and establishing a system of reparations to those 
displaced, thereby fixing the systemic issue.232  But the procedure is 
not always effective, evidenced by cases like Ivanov v. Ukraine,233  
which dealt with Ukraine’s failure to comply with the decision of 
domestic courts regarding retirement benefits for veterans of the 
nation’s military.234  After the case went to the ECtHR, the Court, 
using its powers under the Pilot-Judgment Procedure, “imposed a 
deadline of one year [against Ukraine] for the implementation of 
remedial measures, which it subsequently extended by six 
months . . . because no settlement had been proposed in about 1,000 
communicated cases” by Ukraine to settle their debts to the 
veterans.235  “[T]he Court [then] resumed the examination of the 
adjourned applications” and delivered similar judgments, awarding 
pecuniary damages to over 1,000 cases.236  But because Ukraine 
failed to act and award financial relief to the veterans, the ECtHR 
continued reviewing further cases.237  As of 2017, Ukraine remained 
unwilling to provide financial relief with over 14,430 cases like 
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Ivanov’s still pending, so the Court, for the first time, placed the 
cases within the purview of the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers.238  In June of 2020, more than a decade after the first 
judgment against Ukraine, the Committee and Ukraine’s Ministry 
of Justice met to begin discussing how Ukraine would comply with 
the Court’s demands under the Pilot-Judgment Procedure.239  The 
long length of time as well as lack of clear sanctions highlight the 
shortcomings of the Pilot-Judgment Procedure when countries 
refuse to execute judgments of the ECtHR.240 
If the Pilot-Judgment Procedure was initiated, Russia could 
follow the lead of Poland and make the requisite changes.241  
However, Russia could, alternatively, allow the adverse judgments 
from the ECtHR to pile up with no consequences other than 
engaging in talks with the Committee of Ministers, possibly years 
later.  Such delays would not help the thousands of victims who 
experience violence daily.  Therefore, the Pilot-Judgment Procedure 
cannot be the only tool relied on for change. 
4. Backlash as Pressure for Reform 
As opposed to other external factors, the growing national and 
international attention to domestic violence in Russia could bring 
about reform.  “Naming and shaming” nations for their human 
rights abuses can lead to change.242  For instance, nations that lack 
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a free press or significant political opposition are particularly 
susceptible to international shaming and are more likely to make 
reforms because “international reporting has a much greater 
potential to alter public perceptions of [violative] behavior[.]”243  
The #MeToo movement that has sparked much dialogue regarding 
harassment and violence against women worldwide244  facilitated 
the ousting of perpetrators in positions of power245  and created 
systematic reforms worldwide.246  Activists in Russia also had their 
own crusade in the spirit of #MeToo in which social media was 
flooded with personal stories of domestic violence.247  Hence, the 
activism of citizens demanding accountability and redress for 
human rights abuses in their nation can lead to positive change.248 
Activists have specifically labeled Russia as a nation in need of 
reform.249  In 2018, Human Rights Watch, an international group, 
raised attention to Russia’s domestic violence problem when it 
published the study, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop 
Me,” highlighting the problem of domestic violence in post-Soviet 
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Russia in terms of its prevalence, brutality, and lack of redress.250  
The ECtHR in the Volodina ruling made note of this study as a 
contributing factor as to why it ruled against Russia.251  Nearly 
1,000,000 people worldwide have signed a petition pushing for 
Russia to create a domestic violence law.252  Public shaming can 
invoke action, and while Russia has yet to act, continued coverage 
could bring about reform as Russia faces criticism from citizens, 
NGOs, human rights groups, and other nations. 
C. The Need for Internal Reform 
For any success to occur, Russia, and not an outside judiciary or 
international organization, must initiate and support the change 
needed to protect its citizenry.253  Even the ECtHR reasoned when 
forming the Pilot-Judgment Procedure that systemic problems are 
addressed “more speedily if an effective remedy is established at 
[the] national level[.]”254 
The Russian government is averse to change and reluctant to 
acknowledge that interfamilial violence permeates its society.255  
Parliament has de-criminalized domestic battery,256  instituted 
procedural obstacles for victims to seek justice,257  and allowed 
dozens of pieces of legislation seeking increased victim protection 
to fail.258  The government also refuses to keep statistics on the 
issue.259  Further, Russia prevents activism for change by limiting 
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protests,260  controlling the media,261  and creating a hostile 
environment for NGOs.262  In October 2019, the Justice Ministry 
responded to the ECtHR’s request for answers as to whether 
Russia’s justice system protected victims.263  In its response, Deputy 
Minister Mikhail Galpernin criticized the claims about domestic 
violence as “quite exaggerated” and labeled the complaints in the 
ECtHR as an “attempt to undermine the legal mechanisms already 
codified in Russia[.]”264  Similarly, members of Parliament believe 
domestic violence is a non-issue; lawmaker Yelena Mizulina who 
proposed the 2017 law that de-criminalized domestic violence said 
that women “don’t take offense when they see a man beat his wife” 
and that “a man beating his wife is less offensive than when a 
women humiliates a man.”265 
It is not just Russian leadership that is reluctant to change – 
millions of citizens must also realize that protections for victims is 
the right course of action.  However, the potential for change is 
limited as the rising conservative movement embraces violence to 
keep a house in order.266  Even a draft bill for domestic violence has 
created an uproar as citizens have filed over 11,000 comments on 
the bill, mostly negative.267  A government rules with the consent of 
the people, and with a populace that not only tolerates, but condones 
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violence, it will be hard to implement reform. 
However, there is hope as global conversations regarding 
gender violence have planted a seed of reform in Russian citizens 
which could change the minds of conservative citizens and mobilize 
the more liberal.268  Shortly after the Volodina ruling, Twitter users 
posted their stories of sexual harassment using the hashtag, 
#INeedOpenness, and Instagram users did the same using the 
hashtag #IDidn’tWanttoDie.269  And when the draft bill was 
released in 2019, conservatives may have signed letters and left 
comments, but hundreds of other Russians rallied in Moscow in 
support of the legislation and demanded further protections for 
women.270  The increased number of protests and global 
conversations show that there is a strong voice pushing for reform.  
As technology becomes ubiquitous and facilitates the spread of 
ideas, hopefully norms in Russia will shift towards empathy towards 
victims of violence. 
VI. Conclusion 
Russia faces a crisis leaving thousands of victims each year with 
no haven for protection against domestic violence. But the 
repugnant treatment of domestic violence in Russia no longer lurks 
in the shadows as the last few years have seen increased global 
criticism, unprecedented rulings in the EHCR and from the 
CEDAW Committee, media attention, and a younger generation 
demanding systemic change. Both the external and internal pressure 
on Russia to establish legislation and programs to help victims could 
invoke a systematic change.  Whether this change comes due to 
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mandatory rulings from the ECtHR or from internal demand from 
citizens has yet to be decided.  Russia’s main obstacle, however, is 
the culture of acceptance in Russia that views violence as the glue 
which keeps families together and strong.  This belief is pervasive 
and permeates the culture, preventing victims from seeking 
protection and remedies.  In the future, there may be hope that 
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